When configural cues specify that a figure lies on opposite sides of a repeated border in prime and probe shapes, probe latencies are longer than when prime and probe borders are unrelated. Do such results reflect negative priming for the shape of the prime ground or cross-border competition from figure memory? The present study tested these alternatives by adding partial closure as a competing cue and reducing the similarity between the prime ground and the shape of the probe. Results supported the cross-border competition interpretation. Additional findings were that partial closure is a configural cue and that response effects can emerge from the potential shape on the ground side of a border. One prior experience was sufficient for these effects.
The research reported in this article used novel shapes to investigate the relationship between shape memories and figure-ground assignment. Figure- ground assignment occurs when two regions share a border. The shared border is typically assigned to one region; that region-the figure-appears to have a definite shape and is said to "own" the border. The adjacent region, lacking a border, appears to be locally shapeless and often appears to continue behind the figure as a background; hence, it is called the ground (Rubin, 1915 (Rubin, /1958 .
Much visual perception research assumes implicitly or explicitly that the substrate for the access of shape or object memories must be a shaped entity (i.e., a figure) . Hence, matches to object memories necessarily follow the partial or complete determination of figure and ground. The Gestalt psychologists showed that novel regions that were convex, enclosed, small, and symmetric were more likely to be seen as figures than were adjacent regions that were concave, open, larger in area, and asymmetric. These cues provided a means by which figure assignment could occur before access to object memories. Both Peterson and her colleagues (e.g., Peterson, Harvey, & Weidenbacher, 1991; for review, see Peterson, 1994 for review, see Peterson, , 2003a Peterson & Skow-Grant, 2003) and Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) have reported evidence inconsistent with this traditional figure-ground-first assumption and have proposed theoretical alternatives. In what follows, we review these two lines of recent research and theory.
Peterson's Proposed Alternative to the Figure-Ground-First Assumption
Peterson and her colleagues reported evidence indicating that some form of object-structure memory 1 exerts an influence on the first perceived figure assignment (e.g., Peterson et al., 1991 ; for review, see Peterson, 1994 Peterson, , 2003a Peterson & Skow-Grant, 2003) . Furthermore, Gibson (1993, 1994a) showed that remembered object structure competes with, but does not necessarily dominate, other configural cues and depth cues with which it is placed in conflict (see also . To account for such object-memory effects on figure assignment, they proposed that edges-rather than figures, whole regions, or surfacescan access memories that specify both the spatial relationships between parts and the typical orientation of known objects (Peterson & Gibson, 1993 , 1994a , 1994b . Moreover, Peterson (1995 Peterson ( , 2003b Peterson & Hector, 1996) argued that the structural memories accessed in the course of figure assignment are not holistic. Rather, the relevant memories store object subconfigurations comprising more than a single part sketched by an object's edge and less than the object's whole bounding contour.
2
To account for figure-ground assignment, Peterson (2000 Peterson ( , 2003a Peterson, de Gelder, Rapcsak, Gerhardstein, & Bachoud-Lévi, 2000) presented the parallel interactive model of configural analysis (PIMOCA), shown in Figure 1 . According to PIMOCA, shortly after a portion of an edge is detected in the visual field, both sides are evaluated for traditional configural cues and for remembered object structure, if any. Cues on the same side of the edge cooperate; cues on opposite sides of the edge compete. The shaped figure is ultimately perceived on the more strongly cued side of an edge. Due to the competitive cross-edge interactions, configural cues on the more weakly cued side of an edge are inhibited; this inhibition accounts for the fact that regions adjacent to figures (i.e., grounds) appear locally shapeless. Using a priming task, Peterson and Kim (2001;  see also Peterson & Skow-Grant, 2003; Skow-Grant, Lampignano, Kim, & Peterson, 2002) found evidence that object memories accessed on the more weakly cued side of an edge were inhibited. Thus, according to Peterson and her colleagues, figure and ground assignment results from competition between configural cues on opposite sides of an edge; among these competing configural cues is past experience with a particular edge configuration. Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) Evidence and Proposed Alternative to the Figure-Ground-First Assumption
By adapting a negative-priming paradigm for use with novel figure-ground displays, Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) obtained some fascinating results that led them to propose a different alternative to the traditional figure-ground-first assumption. We review their paradigm in detail because doing so is necessary in order to understand the distinction between their proposal and that of Peterson and colleagues (e.g., Peterson et al., 2000; Peterson & Gibson, 1994a; Peterson & Skow-Grant, 2003) and because the same paradigm is used in the experiments we present in this article.
As is typical in experiments demonstrating negative priming, Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6) showed observers paired prime-probe trials. On the first (prime) trial, an ambiguous figure-ground display was shown above fixation on a gray field (see Figure 2A ). The ambiguous display had a central articulated border shared by a black region and a white region. Observers were instructed to match the black region to a black comparison shape shown below fixation. It is important to note that Treisman and DeSchepper assumed that in order to perform the shapematching task, observers perceived the black region as the shaped figure in the prime figure-ground display and, accordingly, perceived the white region as the shapeless ground.
On the next (probe) trial, two separated shapes, one black and one white, were shown above fixation; the two shapes did not share any borders and were no longer complements of one another (see Figure 2B ). The left-right arrangement of these black and white shapes was the same as that of the black and white regions in the prime figure-ground display. The black shape shown above fixation on the probe trials was a distractor with a novel articulated border; each distractor was unique. The white probe shape shown above fixation is referred to as the standard probe shape. A second white shape was shown below fixation on probe trials; this was the comparison probe shape. The comparison shape faced in the same direction as the standard probe shape. The observers' task on probe trials was to determine whether the standard and comparison probe shapes were the same or different. On experimental probe trials, the standard probe shape was the white region isolated from the prime figure-ground displays (the region that was perceived as a shapeless ground on the prime trial). (On same experimental probe trials, the white region isolated from the prime figure-ground display was shown both above and below fixation.) On control probe trials, the standard probe shape had novel borders that had not been seen previously. Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6) found that observers took longer to respond on experimental probe trials than on control probe trials. From these results, they concluded that before figure and ground are determined, equivalent shape descriptions are created for the two bounded regions lying on opposite sides of a border. As a consequence, equivalent memories are established for the shape of both the figure and the ground, despite the fact that one of these-the figure-is ultimately perceived to be shaped by that border, whereas the other-the ground-is ultimately perceived to be shapeless in the vicinity of the border. That is, Treisman and DeSchepper proposed that memories are established for shapes that might have been perceived, had the apparently shapeless grounds in the prime figure-ground displays been seen as shaped figures. Treisman and DeSchepper interpreted the longer latencies they obtained on experimental, as compared with control, probe trials as reflecting an "ignore" tag attached to the episodic memory of the shape of the ground. The concept of an ignore tag arose in the negative-priming literature to account for longer latencies obtained when stimuli that had been ignored on a prime trial were repeated on a probe trial (e.g., Neill & Valdes, 1996) .
Distinguishing Between the Two Alternatives
The alternatives to the traditional figure-ground-first assumption proposed by Peterson and her colleagues (e.g., Peterson et al., 2000; Peterson & Gibson, 1994a; Peterson & Skow-Grant, 2003) and by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) differ in important ways that have radically different implications for how perceptual organization and object recognition are accomplished. For instance, Treisman and DeSchepper's proposal that prior to the assignment Figure 1 . The parallel interactive model of configural analysis proposed by Peterson et al. (2000) . Shortly after edges are detected (e.g., the portion of a curvilinear edge shown in the center of the figure), figural features such as area, convexity (CONV), memory of object structure (MOS), and closure (CLO) are assessed for both sides. of figure and ground, the shapes of the bounded regions lying on both sides of a shared edge are fully described is very different from Peterson's proposal that prior to figure assignment, edges access subconfigurations of known objects. Treisman and DeSchepper's alternative to the traditional view allows shape assignment to precede figure assignment. In contrast, on Peterson's (1995 Peterson's ( , 2003b view, object-memory effects on figure assignment can be mediated by partial representations of objects, such as those that reside in areas V4 or TEO (e.g., Tanaka, 1996) . Indeed, some theorists have recently shown that partial representations of objects may be important for tasks such as classification, face and object recognition, and figure assignment (e.g., Perrett & Oram, 1998; Peterson, 1995 Peterson, , 2003b Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Ullman & Sali, 2000) .
A related point is that Peterson and colleagues did not assume, as Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) did, that memories are estab- Figure 2 . A: The prime display used by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6) . From "Object Tokens, Attention, and Visual Memory" (p. 30), by A. Treisman and B. DeSchepper, in T. Inui and J. McClelland (Eds.) , Attention and Performance XVI: Information Integration in Perception and Communication, 1996, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press. Reprinted with permission. B: Sample probe trials. The black shapes shown on probe trials were distractors. In the experiment, a given distractor was seen only once, and a given white shape was seen on only one probe trial; the shapes are repeated here for illustrative purposes only. In Treisman and DeSchepper's original research, and in the present experiments, the prime and probe displays were shown on a gray background, and neither the white region of the prime nor the white probe shapes were outlined in black. The white regions are outlined in black here to distinguish them from white background. C: The prime display used in Experiments 1 and 2.
lished for shapes of grounds. Indeed, we consider it improbable that the fully bounded shape of a ground, which is never perceived, is remembered. We consider it more reasonable to posit either that for a given portion of a border, the local configuration of the figure is remembered or that the portion of the border itself is remembered as coded for which side won the cross-edge competition. The latter type of memory could be instantiated as processing weight changes so that the next time the border was encountered there would be a tendency to assign it as a boundary for a figure lying on the same side as that on which it was previously seen (for a compatible point of view, see Mozer, Zemel, Behrmann, & Williams, 1992) . The increased response latencies observed by Treisman and DeSchepper might reflect either of these alternative types of memory rather than memory for the shapes of the ground, as discussed next.
In Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) experimental condition, the top white probe shape necessarily had the same articulated border as the black figures seen on the prime trial (see Figure 3A) . The repeated articulated border may instantiate a memory of where the figure was the first time it was encountered on the prime trial.
According to Peterson et al.'s (2000) competitive model, PIMOCA, this memory would favor assigning the articulated border to what is now its unbounded gray side, whereas the gestalt configural cues of closure and smallness of relative area, as well as expectation and task set, would favor assigning the articulated border to the opposite side (i.e., the white side). According to PIMOCA, the cues present on both sides of the articulated edge compete. This competition may slow figure assignment on experimental probe trials compared with that on control probe trials, in which the borders of white probe shapes have not previously been encountered and past experience does not therefore favor assigning the articulated border to the gray side. The longer reaction times (RTs) on experimental, relative to control, probe trials may reflect this competition-induced delay in figure assignment rather than the consequences of attaching an ignore tag to a memory for the whole shape of the ground, as Treisman and DeSchepper claimed. This alternative interpretation explains Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996, Experiment 6 ) results within the context of a competitive model that accounts for assignment of shape to the figure but not to the ground.
In interpreting their results, Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) did not take a position on how figure assignment occurs; they simply took their results as evidence that an ignore tag had been assigned to the shape of the prime ground, since it was the prime ground that was repeated on the probe trial. Indeed, we think that Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6) overgeneralized to figure-ground displays the negative-priming interpretation that they and other investigators had applied successfully to other types of displays. Treisman and DeSchepper reported their figureground experiments after a series of negative-priming experiments that mostly used overlapping novel-outline drawings as stimuli (see Figure 3B ; see also . They neglected to consider a critical difference between what was repeated across experimental prime and probe trials for outline drawings on the one hand and figure-ground displays on the other. As can be seen in Figure 3B , the overlapping outline drawings did not share a border, hence both may have been seen as shaped entities on the prime trials. In contrast, figures and grounds do share a border, and the assignment of the border to one side precludes the perception of shape on the other side (see Figure  3A) . In the present study, we investigated whether Treisman and DeSchepper's results could be interpreted within Peterson et al.'s (2000) competitive model.
Preliminary Study
We conducted a preliminary experiment using Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) paradigm and displays 3 (see Figures 2A and  2B ) but presenting each display on only one pair of prime and probe trials. Treisman and DeSchepper's original effects were obtained with single exposures to novel stimuli, but these novel stimuli were presented in an experiment in which other stimuli were repeated multiple times. Strayer and Grison (1999; Grison & Strayer, 2001 ) have argued that negative-priming effects are ob- Figure 3 . A: A sample prime (left) and experimental probe (right). Note that the center border of the prime figure-ground display is repeated as the articulated border of the white standard probe. A portion of the gray region is darkened near the articulated border of the white standard probe to illustrate the necessary repetition there of a portion of the shape of the black prime figure. B: The novel overlapping outline drawings used by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996; in negative-priming experiments. Of the overlapping shapes on the left, those with single solid outlines represent attended green shapes; those with double outlines represent unattended red shapes. The dashed-line contour shapes on the right were the comparison shapes, shown in white. The participants' task was to decide whether the green shape was the same as or different from the comparison shape. In the pair of trials shown here, "the unattended red shape in the prime trial becomes the attended green shape in the probe trial" (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996, p. 28) . From "Visual Memory for Novel Shapes: Implicit Coding Without Attention," by B. DeSchepper and A. Treisman, 1996, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22, p. 28. Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission of the author. tained only when stimuli are repeated multiple times during an experiment (but see Luola, Kourtzi, & Shiffrar, 2000; Neill & Joordens, 2002) . Therefore, because Treisman and DeSchepper's results imply that the visual system is remarkably plastic, we considered it important to investigate whether these results could be replicated when all stimuli in an experiment appeared in only one pair of prime-probe trials.
In this preliminary experiment, we found that RTs on experimental probe trials were 29 ms longer than they were on control probe trials, t(46) ϭ 1.87, p Ͻ .04. The results of our preliminary experiment were very similar to Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996, Experiment 6 ) results, in which experimental probe latencies were 26 ms longer than control probe latencies (reported p Ͻ .01). Thus, we were able to replicate Treisman and DeSchepper's effects and demonstrate that stimulus repetition is not necessary for slowed responses on experimental probe trials in this particular paradigm.
The Present Study
We conducted two experiments to distinguish Treisman and DeSchepper's interpretation of what was learned on prime trials from our interpretation. In both experiments, we decreased the similarity between what Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) would consider the global shape of the ground on the prime trial and the white standard shape shown on the probe trial. Because priming effects are known to be larger when the shapes of stimuli are the same on prime and probe trials (e.g., Jacoby, 1983) , this manipulation should diminish the latency differences between experimental and control trials if those differences reflect memory for the shape of the ground, as Treisman and DeSchepper claimed. Alternatively, this manipulation should not diminish the latency differences if those differences reflect cross-border competition for figural status, because all that may be necessary for competition is repetition of the border of the prime figure under conditions in which task set and configural cues other than past experience specify that it is assigned to the side opposite of that to which it was originally assigned. Consistent with the competition hypothesis, we found robust slowing on experimental, compared with control, trials-in some cases our effects were larger than those shown by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) -despite the decreased similarity between the ground in the prime and the standard probe shape.
In addition, in both experiments, we added a second cue that favored assigning the repeated articulated border of the standard white probe to the gray side rather than to the white side, thereby increasing the cross-border competition for standard probe shapes. This second cue-partial closure-was manipulated by variations in the distance between the distractor and the standard probe shape in Experiment 1 and by the presence or absence of a bar that replaced the distractor in Experiment 2. When partial closure added to the effects of past experience, response effects arose from the portion of shape potentially present on the outside of the bounded standard shape. These response effects combined with the effects of competition from past experience, at times exacerbating them and at times canceling them. Taken together, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the slowing of response on experimental trials reflects memory for the figure competition on prime trials, not an independent memory for the ground shape designated with an ignore tag.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we decreased the similarity between the white probe shape and the global ground region in the prime by eliminating the white region from the prime, as shown in Figure 2C . Now, rather than presenting a black and white figure-ground display above fixation on the prime trials, we presented only one black shape above and another black shape below fixation on a gray ground. Thus, no bounded white region was present on the prime trials. As in Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) study, the shapes to be compared on the probe trials were bounded white shapes, as shown in Figure 2B . Except for the repeated articulated border, the white probes were substantially different in shape from the gray ground on the prime trials. Priming effects due to memory for the shape of the ground should be substantially reduced (or even eliminated) by reducing the similarity between the prime and the probe shape (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979) . Alternatively, if the latency differences reported by Treisman and DeSchepper reflect competition from past experience for ownership of the repeated articulated border, repeating the border under conditions favoring assigning it to the opposite side might be sufficient to produce the effects.
Removing the white region from the prime display also decreased the ambiguous nature of the figure-ground displays shown on prime trials by eliminating some cues that favored assigning the articulated border to the white region. Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) prime displays were intended to be ambiguous. Both the black and the white regions in their prime figure-ground displays were enclosed and smaller in area than the surrounding gray region, so these gestalt configural cues did not favor the perception of the black region rather than the white region of the prime as the figure. In most of Treisman and DeSchepper's figure-ground displays, the articulated border was curvilinear and varied in local convexity along its extent, however. Thus, convexity may have favored assigning the edge to the black side along some portions of the edge and to the white side along other portions (see Hochberg, 1962; Peterson, 2003b , for evidence that edge assignment is a local phenomenon, even for continuous articulated edges). Treisman and DeSchepper used task set to direct participants to see the black regions in the primes as figures. If task set was not always successful, however, the white regions may have been seen as figures occasionally on the prime trials, even if only momentarily (because reversal into seeing the black region as figure was necessary to match the standard and comparison shapes). If Treisman and DeSchepper's results reflect some trials on which the white region was seen only as a ground and some trials on which it was seen as a figure before it was seen as a ground, they do not provide an uncontaminated measure of the consequences of seeing the white region as ground in the prime display.
Our prime figure-ground displays were substantially less ambiguous without a white region. Now, closure and smallness of relative area cooperated with task set to favor seeing the black region as the figure. We hoped that with this change, the articulated border of the prime display would be more reliably assigned to the black region, thereby allowing a more sensitive test of the alternative interpretations of the differences reported by Treisman and DeSchepper. 4 As in Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) , observers judged whether the two black shapes shown on prime trials were the same or different.
Probe trials were the same as those used by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) , with one exception that was intended to manipulate the competition for the edge of the white probe. In contemplating the balance of cues on either side of various borders of the displays, we noticed that the black distractor served to partially close the gray area lying between it and the standard white probe shape (see Figure 2B ). Although full closure has been considered a configural cue, partial closure has not. Yet, an experiment by Gillam (1975) provided a reason to think that partial closure might be an effective figural cue. Using common direction of apparent motion as an index that line segments in a 2-D display had been grouped, Gillam demonstrated that once some closure threshold has been exceeded, partially closed regions and completely closed regions produced similar degrees of grouping (see Figure 4A ). Therefore, to investigate the role of partial closure in figure assignment, we presented the black distractor in one of two locations relative to the articulated border of the white probenear versus far, as shown in Figures 4B and 4C , respectively.
We expected that when the distractor was near the articulated border of the standard white probe, it might serve to partially close the gray region between the two shapes to a degree that was sufficient to boost the competition for the articulated border shared by the gray region and the white probe. When the distractor was far from the standard white probe, the critical threshold for the operation of partial closure as a figural cue might not be exceeded. The cues favoring assigning figural status to the gray side of the repeated articulated border of the white standard probe would then include both partial closure and past experience in the neardistractor condition but only past experience in the far-distractor condition. Hence, to the extent that partial closure affects figure assignment, there would be more competition for the border in the near-than in the far-distractor experimental condition. If the location of the distractor interacts with condition (experimental vs. control), the form of the interaction might shed light on which of the two alternative hypotheses-the competition hypothesis or the ground-memory hypothesis-is correct.
Method
Participants. The participants were 20 male and 29 female undergraduate students at the University of Arizona who participated to partially fulfill the requirements of a psychology class.
Stimuli and apparatus. We began with the set of 125 figure-ground displays used by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6) . We altered 32 black and white figure-ground displays by removing the white ground, leaving a black shape with three straight edges and one articulated edge (see Figure 2C , which was generated from Figure 2A ). Displays were 5.5 cm in height (3.3°visual angle) and varied from 1.5 to 2.8 cm in width (0.9°-1.7°). In half of the black shapes, the articulated border appeared on the right side; in the other half, it appeared on the left side. These 32 shapes were shown above fixation on the prime trials. We refer to the stimulus shown above fixation for the comparison task as a standard shape.
In addition, 16 unique black shapes were extracted to be used as comparison shapes (shapes below fixation) on different prime trials, and 32 other unique black regions were extracted to be used as distractor shapes on probe trials. For use as standard shapes on probe trials, 32 white shapes were extracted. Of these 32 white shapes, half were unique and half were extracted from 16 of the figure-ground displays used to create the standard black shapes; these latter white probe shapes had the same articulated border as the standard black shapes in the paired prime display. (Half of the stimuli in all of these sets faced left, and half faced right.) Another 16 unique white shapes were used as the comparison shapes on different probe trials. For practice trials, we used the remaining 13 figure-ground displays from the Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6) set, along with 17 new stimuli designed by Daniel W. Lampignano to match the Treisman and DeSchepper stimuli.
The stimuli were grouped into prime-probe pairs. In prime displays (see Figure 2C ), a black standard shape was located above a fixation cross, which was centered on a gray background, and a black comparison shape was located below the fixation cross. We matched the locations of the black regions in the Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) experiment by centering 4 We do not assert that our prime displays are unambiguous, just that they are substantially less ambiguous than the prime displays used by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) . Because the variations in the local convexity of the articulated edge are present in our displays as they were in Treisman and DeSchepper's, the cue of convexity no doubt competes with closure, smallness of area, and task set along some portions of the articulated edge of our primes. Gillam (1975) . A closed figure on the left, an open figure in the middle, and a partially closed figure on the right. The oblique segments in the middle figure could appear to rotate in opposite directions (clockwise and counterclockwise) when the display was shown in apparent motion around the y-axis. The oblique segments in the left and right displays appeared to rotate in the same direction. From "The Evidence for 'Closure' in Perception," by B. Gillam, 1975 , Perception & Psychophysics, 17, p. 522. Copyright 1975 by the Psychonomic Society. Reprinted with permission. B and C: The near-and far-distractor conditions, respectively, used in Experiment 1. The distances shown here are approximations of those used in the experiment. the comparison shape below the fixation cross and centering the articulated border of the standard shape above the fixation cross. On half of the prime trials, the standard and comparison shapes were the same; on the other half of the prime trials, they were different. In probe displays (see Figure 2B ), separate black and white shapes (not complements of one another) were located above the fixation cross, and a white comparison shape was located below the fixation cross, also on a gray background. On half of the probe trials, the standard and comparison shapes were the same; on the other half of the probe trials, the two shapes were different. The black shape shown above the fixation cross on the probe trials was a distractor. On half of the probe trials, the black distractor was located near the standard white probe shape; the distance between the articulated borders of the white probe and the distractor was 2.0 cm (1.2°of visual angle, approximately the distance used by Treisman & DeSchepper) . On the other half of the probe trials, the black distractor was located far from the standard white probe shape (7 cm; 4.2°of visual angle separated the articulated borders of the white probe and the black distractor).
Prime and probe trials were paired into either experimental or control trials. On experimental probe trials, the standard white probe shape had the same articulated border as the standard black prime shape. On control probe trials, the articulated border of the standard white probe had not been seen before. Same and different probe trials were equally likely following each type of prime trial. These displays were further organized into two sets, A and B, equated on the basis of convexity ratings provided by five expert viewers. When Set A displays were used on experimental trials, Set B displays were used on control trials, and vice versa; this assignment was balanced across participants.
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A VGA monitor was used to present the displays. The screen of the monitor measured 25 cm in height (14.6°visual angle) and 33 cm in width (19.0°). Experimental software was DMDX, developed by Jonathan C. Forster at the University of Arizona (Forster & Forster, 2003) . A chin rest was used to keep viewing distance constant during the experiment. A foot pedal was used to proceed through the trials. Responses were made on a custom button box that recorded RT to a hundredth of a millisecond. RTs were rounded to the nearest millisecond.
Procedure. Participants sat at a distance of 96 cm from the monitor. Instructions were given verbally by Daniel W. Lampignano. While viewing a sample prime display, the participants were told that their task on prime trials was to judge whether the black shapes above and below the fixation cross were the same or different. Participants were instructed to press one of the buttons on the button box if the shapes were the same and the other button if they were different. Next, participants were shown a sample probe display, and they were told that their task was to decide whether the white shapes above and below the fixation cross were the same or different. They were told that the prime and probe trials would be shown in pairs and that each pair would be preceded by the word "Ready." Half of the participants made a same response with their right hand; the other half used their left hand. Participants were instructed to make their responses as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Before each pair of trials, "Ready" appeared in the center of the screen. When the participant was prepared to continue, he or she pressed the foot pedal to initiate the pair of trials. At this point, the word was replaced by a fixation cross that remained on the screen for 500 ms. Next, the prime display was shown until the participant responded (or until 3,000 ms had elapsed, at which point the display was removed and no response was recorded). The participant's response (or the end of the time-out interval) triggered the corresponding probe trial to appear immediately. The probe display was shown until the participant responded or until 3,000 ms had elapsed. A 200-ms delay preceded the appearance of the "Ready" signal for the next pair of trials. Both accuracy and RTs were recorded from 32 experimental prime-probe trial pairs.
Participants received eight practice prime-probe pairs before any RTs were collected. All practice trials were equivalent to control trials. Error feedback was given on the practice trials only.
Results
Trials on which errors were made or the time-out interval was exceeded were excluded before the RT data were analyzed (6.2%). For each condition, any RTs more than two standard deviations from each participant's mean were eliminated recursively (no more than two recursive analyses were ever required); this trimming procedure resulted in the elimination of 3.4% of the responses in Experiment 1.
RTs recorded on both prime and probe displays were analyzed by an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three within-subjects factors-distractor distance (near vs. far), condition (experimental vs. control), and response (same vs. different). Probe RTs were the only RTs reported by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) . For that reason, and because the predictions concern the probe RTs, we focus on the probe RTs below.
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Probe RTs. We first considered the results obtained in the far-distractor condition. As can be seen in Figure 5 , when the distractor was located far from the white probe shape, both same and different response latencies were significantly longer in the experimental condition (788.3 ms) than in the control condition (732.6 ms). Hence, contrary to predictions derived from the ground-shape hypothesis, decreasing the similarity between the overall shape of the white probe and the shape of the ground presented on prime trials did not diminish or eliminate the controlversus-experimental RT differences. (The mean RT difference obtained in the far condition of this experiment was 56 ms, whereas the mean RT differences obtained in the preliminary study, in which we used the same primes as Treisman and DeSchepper, 1996 , was 29 ms.) An ANOVA restricted to the fardistractor trials showed a main effect of condition, F(1, 48) ϭ 17.72, p Ͻ .01, no main effect of response, and no interaction between condition and response (Fs Ͻ 1).
Next, we considered the near-distractor condition, in which both partial closure and past experience favored assigning the repeated articulated border to the gray region, whereas the cues of small area, full closure, and task set favored assigning the repeated border to the white region. Here, response effects emerged. Observers were significantly slower to make same responses (by 46 ms) and significantly faster to make different responses (by 49 ms) than they were in the far-distractor experimental condition ( ps Ͻ .02). Thus, in the near-distractor condition, response interference occurred on same experimental trials and response facilitation occurred on different experimental trials relative to the comparable far-distractor condition.
7 These results were reflected in the overall ANOVA by a significant three-way interaction between condition, response, and distractor distance, F(1, 48) ϭ 4.14, p Ͻ .05, a two-way interaction between response and distractor distance, F(1, 48) ϭ 14.02, p Ͻ .01, and a marginal main effect of response, F(1, 48) ϭ 3.96, p ϭ .05. The main effect of distractor distance was not significant (F Ͻ 1). 5 The analyses showed no differences between sets. 6 No significant effects of condition were observed in the analyses of the prime trial responses, ps Ͼ .73 in both Experiments 1 and 2.
7 In Treisman and DeSchepper's original experiment, all distractors were located near the white probe. Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6) did not report results obtained for same and different responses separately.
Why should response effects occur in the near-distractor condition but not in the far-distractor condition? Adding a second cue, partial closure, to past experience reduced the cross-border differences in cue strength in the near-distractor condition relative to those in the far-distractor condition. If, as we suppose, it takes longer to resolve cross-border competition when cross-border differences in cue strength are small rather than large, then crossborder competition may not have been resolved in the neardistractor condition before the evidence for the same-different response started to accumulate. In that case, the portion of the shape potentially present on the gray side of the articulated border of the white standard probe may have contributed evidence for the same-different response. Because the portion of shape potentially present on the gray side of the white probe was always different from both of the white probe shapes (Rubin, 1915 (Rubin, /1958 ; see Figure  3A of the present article), it would always contribute evidence for a different response, thereby leading to response facilitation on different trials and response interference on same trials. On same trials, response slowing due to this interference added to the response slowing due to competition from past experience alone, as reflected in the far-distractor condition. On different trials, however, response facilitation due to the potential presence of another different shape speeded response sufficiently that the effects of past experience were canceled. Indeed, in the different near-distractor condition, the response latencies were statistically equivalent in the experimental and control conditions, t(48) ϭ 1.60, p Ͼ .10.
It is likely that these response effects emerged before figureground assignment was completed. We stress, however, that this finding does not mean that the whole ground received a shape description before figure assignment was completed. The response effects most likely arose from the portion of the ground near the repeated articulated border.
Probe errors. Errors were more likely to occur in the experimental condition (8.4%) than in the control condition (3.8%) and were more likely on same trials (7.5%) than on different trials (4.7%). An ANOVA conducted on the errors revealed main effects of condition and response, Fs(1, 48) ϭ 14.84 and 4.30, respectively, ps Ͻ .05. No other main effects or interactions were significant.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with our hypothesis that the slower RTs on experimental than on control trials reflect competition from a memory of where the figure lay relative to the articulated border when it was first encountered on the prime trial. This memory favors assigning the border to the same side when it is next encountered on the probe trial. On the probe trial, however, both task set and the configural cues of full closure and smallness of relative area favor assigning the repeated border to the opposite side. The competition between cues favoring assigning figural status to opposite sides of the border slows responses on experimental trials compared to those on control trials (and leads to more errors).
The interaction among distractor distance, condition, and response provided additional evidence for the competition hypothesis by showing that the pattern of results can be altered by changing the balance of figure cues present on opposite sides of the articulated border. That response effects emerged in the experimental near-distractor condition was further evidence that the ground side of the repeated articulated probe border was being processed.
The pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1 does not seem compatible with an explanation in terms of memory for the shape of the prime ground. Had the different response latencies obtained on experimental and probe trials reflected memories for the shape of the prime's ground, they should have been attenuated here because, in our experiment, the shape of the probe was not identical to the shape of the ground on the prime trial. Nevertheless, in our experiment, as in Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996, Experiment 6), response latencies were longer on experimental trials than on control trials. Therefore, as predicted by the competition hypothesis, repetition of the whole bounded region that was perceived to be ground in the prime is not necessary for the longer latencies on experimental trials. At least in our task, repetition of the articulated border of the prime under conditions in which it must be assigned to the opposite side is sufficient.
Can our finding that the distance to the distractor interacted with condition be interpreted as consistent with a negative-priming interpretation and, hence, with the memory for the shape of the ground hypothesis? It has been shown that negative priming is less likely to be obtained when there are no distractors on probe trials (Lowe, 1979; Milliken, Joordens, Merikle, & Seiffert, 1998; Moore, 1994) . If our far-distractor condition was functionally equivalent to a no-distractor condition, then, on a negative priming interpretation, one might have expected to see the latency differences between experimental and control conditions disappear in the far-distractor condition. Although we did observe less slowing on experimental same trials in the far-distractor condition than in the near-distractor condition, we observed more slowing on experimental different trials in the far-distractor condition than the near-distractor condition. Thus, the near-versus far-distractor conditions do not appear simply to be manipulating the functional presence versus absence of the distractor. Instead, the near-versus far-distractor conditions seem to be manipulating the strength of the cues that favor assigning the figure to the gray side of the articulated border of the white probe. When those cues are stronger (in the near-distractor condition, in which both partial closure and past experience favor assigning the border of the white standard probe to the gray side), response effects emerge. Those response effects indicate that figural cues on the ground side of the standard probe are being processed in the course of figure assignment, as predicted by Peterson et al. (2000) , but they do not indicate that the whole shape of the ground is described or remembered. In Experiment 2, we eliminated the distractor in order to investigate directly whether it served any role other than that of providing partial closure to the region between it and the articulated border of the standard white probe.
Experiment 2
On the basis of evidence reported by others (e.g., Lowe, 1979; Milliken et al., 1998; Moore, 1994) , we reasoned that if the RT differences obtained in Experiment 1 reflected negative priming for the shape of the ground, then removing the distractor altogether should eliminate them. (With no distractor, the negative-priming effects might turn into positive-priming effects-see Milliken et al., 1998) . In contrast, if the RT differences reflected competition for ownership of the repeated articulated border, then only the repetition of the border would be necessary, the presence of a distractor would not.
In order to test the effects of partial closure in this experiment, on half of the probe trials we included a vertical bar in a location similar to that occupied by the near distractor in Experiment 1. Having no articulated border, the bar was not at all similar to the white shapes; hence, we did not expect it to function as a distractor. When the bar was present, the gray region between it and the articulated border of the white probe was partially closed. When the bar was absent, partial closure was absent as well. (In Experiment 1, some degree of partial closure was always present, even though the degree of partial closure was manipulated by the distance factor.) In Experiment 2, the competition for ownership of the articulated border was expected to be greater when the bar was present than when it was absent, in both the experimental and the control conditions. Because the border of the prime display was repeated in the experimental condition, the competition for ownership of the repeated border was expected to be particularly large in the experimental bar-present condition.
Method
Participants. The participants were 23 male and 37 female undergraduate students at the University of Arizona who participated in order to meet a requirement of their introductory psychology course.
Stimuli and apparatus. The stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 1, except that the black distractors were removed from the set. The height of the bar was the same as that of the probe stimuli: 3 mm in width (approximately 10 min of arc visual angle). The distance between the articulated border of the standard white probe and the bar was approximately 0.9°of visual angle.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as for Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Trials on which errors were made or the time-out interval was exceeded were excluded before the RT data were analyzed (7.0%). The RT-trimming procedure resulted in the elimination of 2.5% of the responses in Experiment 2. Separate ANOVAs with three within-subjects factors-condition (experimental vs. control), response (same vs. different), and bar (present vs. absent) were conducted on probe RTs and error rates.
Probe RTs. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, F(1, 59) ϭ 12.54, p Ͻ .01. Participants took significantly longer to respond on experimental probe trials than on control probe trials (mean difference ϭ 59 ms). As in Experiment 1, the RT differences between experimental and control probe trials were not diminished by the fact that the shape of the probe did not match the ground in the prime.
In the bar-absent condition, experimental RTs were 38 ms longer than control RTs. (An ANOVA conducted on the bar-absent condition alone showed a main effect of condition, F[1, 59] ϭ 4.20, p Ͻ .05, and no interaction between condition and response, F Ͻ 1.) Hence, the RT differences between experimental and control probe trials in Experiment 1 did not reflect negative priming for the remembered shape of the ground; had they done so, removing the distractor in Experiment 2 would have eliminated the RT differences. Therefore, the difference between experimental and control RTs in the bar-absent condition can be taken to index the effect of increased competition due to past experience. Different responses were significantly faster than same responses in both experimental (by 187 ms) and control (by 152 ms) conditions, as revealed in the overall ANOVA by a main effect of response, F(1, 59) ϭ 42.17, p Ͻ .01. (This effect was evident in ANOVAs conducted on the experimental and control RTs separately, F[1, 59] ϭ 30.26 and 39.71, respectively, ps Ͻ .01.) Hence, in Experiment 2, unlike Experiment 1, different responses were faster than same responses in all conditions. We return to discuss this and other differences between Experiments 1 and 2 below.
As shown in Figure 6 , the presence of the bar exacerbated the response effect in the experimental condition, whereas it had little effect on the response effect in the control condition. In the experimental condition, RTs to make same responses were significantly longer when the bar was present than when it was absent (by 138 ms, p Ͻ .01), whereas RTs to make different responses were significantly shorter when the bar was present than when it was absent (by 33 ms, p Ͻ .04). Thus, as in Experiment 1, a larger response effect was evident when partial closure supplemented the cue of past experience (in the bar-present experimental condition). When both cues favored assigning the repeated border of the white probe to the gray side, response-interference effects were evident on same trials and response-facilitation effects were evident on different trials. The response-interference effects in the experimental bar-present same condition amplified the effects due to past experience alone (in the experimental bar-absent same condition).
The response-facilitation effects in the experimental bar-present different condition canceled the effects due to past experience alone (in the experimental bar-absent different condition). As in Experiment 1, different RTs in the experimental and control conditions were statistically equivalent in the bar-present condition ( p Ͼ .12). These effects were reflected in the ANOVA by a three-way interaction between condition, response, and bar, F(1, 59) ϭ 5.11, p Ͻ .03, a two-way interaction between response and bar, F(1, 59) ϭ 20.37, p Ͻ .01, and a main effect of bar presence, F(1, 59) ϭ 7.26, p Ͻ .01. An ANOVA conducted on the control trials alone showed an effect of response only ( p Ͻ .01); the two-way interaction between response and bar was not significant ( p Ͼ .13).
Probe errors. The pattern revealed in the RTs was evident in the errors as well. In general, larger proportions of errors occurred on experimental than on control trials (9.4% vs. 4.7%) and on same than on different trials (10.6% vs. 3.4%). These effects were tempered by the presence of the bar in the experimental condition but not in the control condition. In the experimental condition, errors were more likely on same trials when the bar was present versus absent (17.9% vs. 12.5%), and they were less likely on different trials when the bar was present versus absent (1.7% vs. 5.4%). These effects were shown to be significant by a three-way interaction among condition, response, and bar, F(1, 59) ϭ 5.91, p Ͻ .02, by main effects of condition and response, Fs(1, 59) ϭ 13.50 and 25.65, respectively, ps Ͻ .01, and by a two-way interaction between condition and response, F(1, 59) ϭ 13.25, p Ͻ .01.
Comparison Between Experiments 1 and 2
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 were compared in an ANOVA with one between-subjects factor (experiment) and three within-subjects factors (condition, response, and partial closure). 8 The ANOVA showed that removing the distractor significantly changed the pattern of results. RTs were longer in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, as shown by a main effect of experiment, F(1, 107) ϭ 10.82, p ϭ .01. Same responses were elevated more than were different responses, as shown by an interaction between response and experiment, F(1, 107) ϭ 19.58, p Ͻ .01. In addition, the between-experiment ANOVA showed a main effect of partial closure and an interaction between experiment and partial closure, Fs(1, 107) ϭ 5.05 and 4.23, respectively, ps Ͻ .05. These effects reflect the fact that a main effect of bar presence was obtained in Experiment 2, but there was no main effect of distractor distance in Experiment 1. No other interactions involving experiment were significant. Any effects that were significant in either Experiment 1 or 2 were significant in the overall ANOVA as well.
A priori, one might have expected RTs to be shorter in Experiment 2 when the distractors were absent; instead, they were longer. Recall that compared with Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 response effects were evident in the control condition, and same responses were elevated more than were different responses in the experimental condition. These findings suggest two possible interpretations of the fact that RTs were longer in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
First, the presence of the distractors in Experiment 1 may have boosted the effectiveness of the configural cues of smallness of area and full closure. Consistent with this hypothesis, Kim and Peterson (2001 have shown that the effectiveness of the configural cue of convexity increases as the number of convex regions in a display increases. With the distractor present, there were more small, fully closed regions in the probe displays in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. If the strength of the cues of small area and full closure also increases with repetition, then the strength of the cues favoring assignment of the probe edge to the white side would have been relatively larger in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 on both control and experimental trials. (Consistent with this possibility, an effect of partial closure was evident on both control and experimental trials in Experiment 2 but only on experimental trials in Experiment 1.) It is likely that the strength of the cues favoring assignment of the probe edge to the gray side (past experience and partial closure) was approximately equal in Experiments 1 and 2. If the time taken to resolve cross-border competition decreases as the difference in the strength of the configural cues on opposite sides of the border increases, then less time would have been needed to resolve the cross-border competition in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. RTs would then be expected to be shorter in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. The possibility that the cross-edge competition took longer to resolve in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 might also explain why we obtained response effects on control trials in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1. Perhaps, even on control trials in Experiment 2, the cross-edge competition was not resolved before evidence for the same-different response began to accumulate.
Alternatively, or in addition, the overall faster responses in Experiment 1 may have reflected a strategy inspired by the presence of the distractors, which were always different from the white probes. When the distractor was phenomenologically present in Experiment 1, participants may have attempted to prevent it from interfering with response by focusing on the white probes. This strategy may have succeeded to some degree in eliminating response effects arising from both the black distractor and the gray region between it and the white probe, except when the competition for border ownership was substantial in the experimental near-distractor condition. However, in Experiment 2, only white shapes were phenomenologically present in the probe displays. Therefore, there was no obvious reason for observers to adopt a strategy of focusing on them; there appeared to be nothing to exclude. Nevertheless, response effects may have arisen from the portion of the gray shape potentially present on the side of the articulated border in both control and experimental trials. (Note that this explanation assumes that cross-border competition is present for all borders and is potentially measurable in both experimental and control conditions; see also Footnote 4 and Peterson, 2003b .) The response effects take the form of response interference for same responses, accounting for the large increase in same RTs in Experiment 2 compared with Experiment 1. Consistent with this explanation, Lavie (1995) has argued that irrelevant information is less likely to be processed under high-load conditions. Perhaps the irrelevant portion of shape on the gray side of the border was excluded more successfully under the relatively high-load conditions of Experiment 1 than under the relatively low-load conditions of Experiment 2. We are not certain that the perceptual-load explanation applies to the current results, however, because a single distractor condition (as in Experiment 1) has been considered a low-load condition by Lavie.
Distinguishing between these alternative views of the betweenexperiment differences is beyond the scope of the present experiments. For our purposes, the critical finding was that the same pattern was evident in both experiments when observers' responses on experimental trials were compared with their responses on control trials.
General Discussion
In Experiments 1 and 2, we found that contrary to predictions from Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) memory for the shape of the ground hypothesis, the pattern of slower RTs on experimental versus control probe trials did not require that the whole ground region of the prime display be repeated as a shaped figure on probe trials. Rather, in our experiment, the repetition of the articulated border of the prime, under conditions in which the task required it to be seen as bounding a shape lying on the opposite side, was sufficient to produce the slower RTs (except when response facilitation canceled the effects of past experience). Thus, our results indicate that following exposure to a novel figure in the prime, memory does not preserve the whole shape of the ground. Instead, memory preserves either (a) the prime figure as shaped locally by the articulated border or (b) the outcome of the cross-edge competition that occurred the first time this portion of border was encountered. When the border is repeated on experimental probe trials, past experience serves as a cue that it bounds a figure on the same side again. However, other cues (i.e., full closure, smallness of area, and task set) favor the interpretation that the repeated border bounds a figure lying on the opposite side. Our results indicate that the cross-border competition between these cues slows figure assignment on experimental probe trials compared with that on control probe trials, in which no border repetition occurs. We submit that the slowed figure assignment is responsible for the RT differences reported by Treisman and DeSchepper as well as those reported here.
Is it possible that Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) results did reflect negative priming for the shapes of the white regions in their primes, even if ours did not reflect negative priming for the grounds in our primes? After all, their prime displays looked quite different from ours (compare Figures 2A and 2C) , so it is possible that the memories established for them were different too. We believe that Treisman and DeSchepper's results could reflect negative priming for the white regions in their primes, but only if those white regions were seen as figures, not if they were seen as grounds. Recall that Treisman and DeSchepper intentionally used ambiguous displays. We argued in the introduction to Experiment 1 that because the original displays were ambiguous, Treisman and DeSchepper's participants might have seen the white regions as figures on at least some of the prime trials. If they did, then their slower responses on experimental versus control probe trials might reflect negative priming that accrued to prime figures, not to prime grounds. A finding that negative priming accrued to figures that had been perceived only once before and ignored (i.e., on the prime trial) is interesting and important (see the One-Trial Learning section below). However, that interpretation is very different from the memory for the shape of the ground interpretation, which entails episodic memory for shaped entities that were never perceived (i.e., for grounds). We argue that Treisman and DeSchepper's original results do not provide unequivocal support for their memory for the shape of the ground hypothesis-the RT differences they obtained between experimental and control trials can be explained either by our competition hypothesis or as the results of negative priming for white figures.
Can our results be classified as evidence of negative priming, even if not negative priming for grounds? Neill and Mathis (1998) proposed that negative priming is often an instance of transferinappropriate processing. Transfer-inappropriate processing occurs when the task demands for processing a stimulus the second time it is encountered are incompatible with the demands for processing it the first time (Neill & Mathis, 1998) . In order to make the same-different judgment required by the Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) task, observers had to assign the articulated border to one side on the prime trial and to the opposite side on the experimental probe trial. Surely, this could be considered an instance of transfer-inappropriate processing for the repeated articulated border. Therefore, both Treisman and DeSchepper's results and the present results might be considered evidence of negative priming due to transfer-inappropriate processing for the repeated articulated border, albeit not for the shape of the prime ground.
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The cross-border-competition hypothesis provides the best explanation for why the requirement to assign the articulated edge to one side on prime trials and to the opposite side on probe trials results in longer response latencies.
Partial Closure and Response Effects Arising in the Course of Figure Assignment
Partial closure. These experiments demonstrated that partial closure can serve as a figural cue; full closure is not necessary. Hence, for figure assignment, closure is not necessarily a regionwide cue as has been assumed; rather, it can operate for portions of regions. Other configural cues such as convexity (Hoffman & Singh, 1997; Stevens & Brookes, 1988) , symmetry (Leyton, 1987) , and past experience (Peterson, 1995; 2003b) can operate locally. Thus, it is possible that for a continuous border, multiple local competitions determine border ownership along different portions of its extent. These findings, along with the present research, support the idea that it is not possible to determine stimulus ambiguity holistically by tallying the figural cues for whole regions (see also Hochberg, 1962; Peterson, 2003b) .
Response effects. The present results show that response effects, reflecting the fact that portions of different shapes are sketched along opposite sides of an edge, can arise while figure assignment is in progress. These response effects were evident primarily when the difference in the strength of the configural cues on opposite sides of the border was decreased, and, therefore, more time was required to resolve the cross-border competition. Under such circumstances, the evidence for the same-different judgment began to accumulate while the portion of a shape lying on the opposite side of the border from the probe shape still had some potential to be seen as a figure. To our knowledge, these are the first experiments to show such effects.
The response effects we observed could lengthen response latencies already lengthened because of cross-border competition (e.g., the response interference that occurred on experimental same trials when partial closure was present). However, response effects could also cancel the effects of cross-border competition (e.g., when response facilitation occurred on experimental different trials when partial closure was present). Therefore, whenever Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) paradigm (or other similar priming paradigms) are used to investigate whether or not the ground side of a probe shape is assessed, care must be taken to separate response effects from competition effects.
One-Trial Learning
Whether or not we agree with Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996, Experiment 6 ) interpretation of what was learned, their original results are a powerful demonstration of one-trial learning (see also Luola et al., 2000) . Along with the current experiments, Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996, Experiment 6) results clearly show that seeing a border assigned to one side on one prior occasion is sufficient to establish a memory that affects figure assignment the next time the border is encountered 10 (see also Peterson & Enns, 2003; Peterson, Enns, & Woods, 2002) . Because it has been believed for so long that past experience cannot affect figure assignment, it is remarkable to find that a single past exposure to a figure is sufficient to exert measurable effects on subsequent figure assignment. The use of an implicit measure along with novel displays was necessary to reveal this particular effect. The repeated border was not phenomenologically assigned to the side favored by past experience on experimental probe trials. Thus, direct report would not have revealed the effects of past experience. However, the cross-border competition was larger in the experimental condition because of the presence of the past-experience cue; this increased competition was measurable in RTs. Much of the resistance to the idea that past experience affects figure assignment arises because theorists believe that past experience must dominate all other cues (for review, see Peterson, 1999) . The present results, along with other results reported by Peterson and colleagues (Peterson & Gibson, 1993 , 1994a Skow-Grant et al., 2002) , show that this belief is unfounded. Indeed, Peterson (2003a) has argued that past experience is simply one more configural cue.
In other experiments using outline drawings in a negativepriming paradigm, Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) found that shape memories established following a single exposure to a novel outline shape were evident up to a month later. These results suggest that the shape-memory system is exceptionally plastic. For figure-ground displays, Treisman and DeSchepper reported that memories established following a single exposure could be observed in responses to probes that appeared three trials later. It will be important to determine the longevity of this particular form of memory, one that is likely to reside earlier in the ventral pathway than memory for whole shapes (Peterson, 2003b) .
Relationship to Other Previous Studies
Previous studies by Baylis and Driver (1995; Driver & Baylis, 1996) investigated whether or not borders per se can be remembered. They explicitly asked observers to remember an articulated border of a briefly exposed standard shape in order to choose which of two subsequently viewed comparison shapes had the same border. The critical manipulation was whether the repeated articulated border of the comparison stimulus bound a shape lying on the same side as it did in the standard shape or on the opposite side. Observers responded faster and more accurately in the former condition than in the latter. Based on these results, Baylis and Driver argued that borders couldn't be remembered independently of the direction to which they are assigned; they are necessarily remembered explicitly as boundaries for specific shapes.
We did not ask our participants to remember the shape of the border of the prime, nor did we test their memory explicitly. Our experiments index implicit memories rather than explicit memories. The results of the present experiments can be taken as consistent with a version of Baylis and Driver's (1995; Driver & Baylis, 1996) conclusion, provided that it is restated in terms of memories coded in processing weights rather than explicit memories. Moreover, the results of the present experiments can be explained as well by the operation of a border memory that preserves the outcome of the competition for figure assignment across that border the first time it was encountered. Indeed, it may not be possible to distinguish empirically between the proposals regarding implicit memories for partial figures or for borders. Baylis and Driver (1995; Driver & Baylis, 1996) reached a second conclusion with which, even with suitable amendments, we cannot agree. They interpreted their evidence as inconsistent with Peterson and colleagues' (Peterson, 1994; Peterson & Gibson, 1994a , 1994b proposal that grounds are assessed before figure assignment is determined. Baylis and Driver argued that had the ground of their standard shape been assessed, observers' responses should have been unaffected by the side to which the repeated border was assigned on their comparison trials. However, it should be clear from the foregoing discussions that this prediction does not follow logically from the position espoused by Peterson and colleagues. We do not suppose that the holistic shape of the ground will be remembered; we suppose only that figural cues are assessed on both sides of a border (including the side that is ultimately seen as the ground). We have interpreted the longer RT differences obtained on experimental versus control probe trials in the present experiments as evidence that the ground side of the articulated border of the white probe is assessed before figure assignment is determined. We can apply this interpretation to the RT differences obtained in the present experiments because the design included control trials on which the white probes had novel borders as well as experimental trials on which the prime's artic-ulated border was repeated but assigned to the opposite side. (Note that Treisman and DeSchepper, 1996 , did not include probe trials on which the articulated border was repeated but assigned to the same side; the assumption is that observers would have been faster on those trials than on control trials. This is a standard priming condition.) Baylis and Driver's (1995; Driver & Baylis, 1996) explicitmemory paradigm did not permit the inclusion of control probe trials. They compared RTs obtained on comparison trials in which the repeated articulated border was assigned to the same side versus the opposite side to which it had been assigned in the standard shape. Thus, they could not determine whether response latencies obtained for the opposite-side shapes were longer than they would have been had the articulated border of the comparison shape been novel. Indeed, when Peterson et al. (2002; Peterson & Enns, 2003) adapted Baylis and Driver's design to include a control condition, they found that response latencies were longer when a repeated border was assigned to the opposite side than when border repetition did not occur (i.e., the control condition). Peterson et al. (2002) argued that the RT differences they obtained in this adapted version of the Baylis and Driver paradigm also reflect competition from the past-experience cue present on the ground side of the border.
Inhibition of Grounds or Cross-Border Competition?
The present results were interpreted within the competitive model proposed by Peterson et al. (2000; see also Peterson, 2000 see also Peterson, , 2003a Peterson & Skow-Grant, 2003 ). In that model, shown in Figure 1 , cross-border inhibition accounts for the perceived lack of local shape on the side of a border opposite a more strongly cued figure. The proposal is that the ensemble of cues on the more strongly cued side inhibits any configural cues, including memories of partial object structure, accessed on the more weakly cued side of a border. The inhibition was proposed to account for the fact that the more weakly cued side of a border appears locally shapeless, even if some figural cues (including memories of partial object structure) favor assigning the border to that side. Peterson and Kim (2001; Skow-Grant et al., 2002) tested for the predicted inhibition by presenting symmetric novel-silhouette primes (to which observers made no response) briefly before line-drawing targets to which observers made a speeded object decision (known vs. novel object). The critical manipulation concerned the primes preceding the line drawings of known objects. The borders of half of the novel silhouettes sketched a portion of the same basic-level object along the ground side (experimental condition). (As an example of a prime that might have been used in this condition, consider a small version of a black silhouette, like the Rubin [1915 Rubin [ /1958 vase, shown centered on the screen in such away that the bounded black silhouette would be seen as the figure. Although two face profiles would be sketched on the outside of the vase, they would not be perceived; the outside would be perceived as a shapeless ground. An example of a paired line drawing would be a three-quarters view of a face.) The borders of the other half of the novel silhouettes sketched either an object from a different category along the ground side (e.g., a coffee pot in the ground of the silhouette preceding the line drawing of the face) or a novel shape; these were control silhouettes. The primes and line drawings paired in the experimental condition did not have the same border; they were related to each other by virtue of the basic-level category of the known object sketched by their contours. Moreover, it was expected that observers had not previously been exposed to the particular border used in the silhouette prime. Peterson and Kim (2001; Peterson & Skow-Grant, 2003; SkowGrant et al., 2002) found that response latencies were longer in the experimental condition than in the control condition. These results showed, by an indirect measure, that memories of partial object structure formed on the basis of past experience outside the laboratory were accessed in the course of determining where the figure lay with respect to a border that had not itself been seen before. The results showed further that these memories of object structure were inhibited if they were accessed on the more weakly cued side of the border. Peterson and colleagues found evidence for inhibition at stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) between primes and line-drawing targets of 50, 83, and 106 ms; they did not find evidence for inhibition at SOAs of 200, 350, 500, or 650 ms. Thus, the cross-border inhibition applied to preexisting memories of known objects when a new exemplar is sketched along the ground side of a prime appears to be short-lived.
We interpreted the present results as evidence of cross-border competition, rather than cross-border inhibition, for a number of reasons. First, the SOAs used in the present experiments were much longer than those at which consequences of cross-border inhibition have been observed-an average of 1,700 ms in Experiment 2 (mean RT plus intertrial interval). Also, Treisman and DeSchepper (1996, Experiment 6 ) obtained longer latencies on experimental probes than on control probes even when the experimental probes were shown three trials after their associated primes. Second, the articulated border shown in the prime display was repeated on the probe display in the present experiments and in Treisman and DeSchepper's (1996) Experiment 6, whereas it was not repeated in the experiments conducted by Peterson and Kim (2001; Skow-Grant et al., 2002) . Thus, the present experiments can assay memory for a particular novel border that had been seen only once before the probe trials (i.e., on the prime trial), whereas Peterson and Kim (2001; Skow-Grant et al., 2002) assayed the consequences of accessing preexisting memories of portions of similar basic-level objects. The mechanisms mediating short-lived inhibition and memory for past experience with a previously seen border may be different. They certainly seem to follow a different time course. Future experiments will be needed to investigate the relationship between inhibition and competition in more depth.
Conclusions
On the basis of the results of the two experiments presented in this article, we conclude that assigning figure on one side of a novel border the first time it is encountered creates a tendency to assign figure on the same side of the border the next time it is encountered. If other cues specify that the figure lies on the opposite side when the border is next encountered, time is required to resolve the competition between those other cues and past experience. Indeed, in the current experiments, the balance of figural cues (and task set) was such that, the second time the border was encountered, the figure was perceived to lie on the opposite side. The fact that past experience entered into the competitive figure-assignment process was revealed by longer RTs when past experience favored seeing the figure on the original side than when past experience was not relevant (because the border was being seen for the first time). By showing that competition from past experience can delay figure assignment, these results support a competitive model of figure assignment such as that proposed by Peterson et al. (2000) .
